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THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT: CLOSING
THE NET ON DOPING
PETER CHARLISH ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The use and, indeed, the dangers of performance-enhancing drugs in
sports have a long history. For example, the first recorded death linked to
such substances during athletic competition took place in 1886 when a cyclist,
Arthur Linton, overdosed on trimethyl. 1 The first known use of performanceenhancing drugs at the Olympic Games occurred in 1904 when Thomas Hicks
of the United States won the Olympic marathon despite taking a concoction
that included Strychnine and alcohol. 2 In 1960, the first recorded death linked
to drugs at the Olympic Games occurred when Danish cyclist Knud Jensen
crashed and died; his autopsy revealed traces of amphetamines in his system. 3
It was at this time that pressure began to mount on the sporting authorities
to combat the abuse of performance-enhancing substances. 4 In 1966, the first
drug tests were introduced by the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) at their respective
World Championships. 5 The following year, the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) produced its first prohibited list of performance-enhancing
substances (anabolic steroids were not added to that list until 1976), and its
first official drug tests took place at the 1968 Winter and Summer Olympic
Games. 6 Still, the 1970s and 1980s saw the enactment of State Plan 14-25 in
East Germany, which was a government plan⎯a very successful one⎯used
for widespread systematic doping on promising young athletes to achieve
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1. Drugs in Sport: A Brief History, OBSERVER SPORT MONTHLY (Feb. 8, 2004) http://observer.
guardian .co.uk/ osm/story/0,,1140775,00.html.
2. Andy Bull, Cheats Sometimes Prosper, THE GUARDIAN (London) (May 30, 2008) http://www.
guardian.co.uk/ sport/2008/may/30/drugsinsport.olympicgames.
3. A Brief History of Anti-Doping, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/
en/About-WADA/History/A-Brief-History-of-Anti-Doping (last updated June 2010).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Olympic glory. In 1998, the Festina 7 scandal in the Tour de France occurred,
in which the police discovered large quantities of drugs in the Festina team car
and also at the Festina team headquarters in Lyon, France. 8 It was this
incident that eventually led to the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) in 1999 and the creation of the WADA Code (the Code), which
came into effect January 1, 2004. 9 The Code was the first attempt to provide a
worldwide framework for the regulation of drugs in sports.
The backbone and primary pillar of the Code was, and still is, the principle
of strict liability. The Code explains the principle: “it is not necessary that
intent, fault, negligence[,] or knowing [u]se on the [a]thlete’s part be
demonstrated in order to establish an anti-doping violation.” 10 The comments
to the Code go on to state that:
The strict liability rule . . . provides a reasonable balance
between effective anti-doping enforcement for the benefit of
all “clean” Athletes and fairness in the exceptional
circumstance where a Prohibited Substance entered an
Athlete’s system through No Fault or Negligence or No
Significant Fault or Negligence on the Athlete’s part . . . . The
strict liability principle set forth in the Code has been
consistently upheld in the decisions of [the Court of
Arbitration for Sport]. 11
The strict liability principle is viewed as fundamental to the fight against
doping in sports. Lord Sebastian Coe 12 expressed this view in 2004, stating
that “we cannot, without blinding reason and cause, move one millimeter from
strict liability [⎯] if we do, the battle to save sport is lost.” 13 Because the
strict liability rule has been the basis of anti-doping rules in sports for many
years, it was no surprise that the legality of the principle, in conjunction with
the provision of a two-year ban for a doping violation, was challenged over
twenty years ago in Gasser v. Stinson. 14 In this case, Swiss middle-distance
7. Festina was the number one team in the Tour de France at the time.
8. A Brief History of Anti-Doping, supra note 3.
9. WADA History, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/About-WADA/
History/ WADA-History/ (last updated Nov. 2009).
10. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 2.1.1 (2011) [hereinafter WADA CODE].
11. See id at art. 2.1.1 cmt.
12. Former double Olympic Gold Medalist at the 1500m.
13. Sebastian Coe, We Cannot Move From Strict Liability Rule, DAILY TEL. (London) (Feb. 25,
2004) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jhtml?xml=/sport/2004/02/25/socoe25.xml.
14. See generally Gasser v. Stinson, [1988] EWHC (Q.B.) 1 (Eng.).
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runner Sandra Gasser challenged the two-year ban imposed upon her for
testing positive for an illegal substance. 15 She suggested that Rule 144 of the
International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF), which provided strict
liability, did not allow her to prove her innocence, and coupled with the
subsequent two-year ban imposed on her for the commission of the doping
violation, amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade. 16 The Court of Queen’s
Bench examined the strict liability rule and stated the following:
The disqualification it imposes is automatic.
The
disqualification does not depend upon any guilty intent on the
part of the athlete. He or she may not have known that the
substance was being ingested. The disqualification depends
on no more than the finding of the prohibited substance in the
athlete’s urine. 17
The Court of Queen’s Bench went on to support the IAAF’s position that
doping posed a very serious threat to the integrity and future of sports,
specifically by endorsing the view of the then-IAAF General Secretary, who
stated,
The use of drugs is widely regarded as a disease in sport.
Competitors who use drugs to enhance their performance are
simply cheating. Any sport [that] is infiltrated by drugs and in
respect of which it becomes common knowledge that its
participants use drugs is likely to suffer substantially in its
public image and reputation. 18
Set in this context, the Court of Queen’s Bench ruled that the restraint of
trade imposed by the two-year ban, which was founded on the principle of
strict liability, was indeed reasonable and proportionate and, therefore, not
unlawful. 19
The principle of strict liability has also received appropriate endorsement
from the CAS, which made clear as far back as 1995 in the case of USA
Shooting & Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir 20 that “[t]he fact that the [CAS]

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
See generally USA Shooting & Q. v. Union Int’l de Tir, CAS 94/A/129, (May 23, 1995).
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has sympathy for the principle of a strict liability rule obviously does not allow
the CAS to create such a rule where it does not exist.” 21
Quite clearly, the policy of strict liability can sometimes lead to unjust
results. 22 However, without a doubt, the policy was implemented for very
specific reasons, which were aptly summed up by the CAS in USA Shooting &
Q.:
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be
unfair in an individual case . . . where the Athlete may have
taken medication as the result of [mislabeling] or faulty advice
for which he or she is not responsible . . . . But it is also in
some sense “unfair” for an athlete to get food poisoning on the
eve of an important competition. Yet in neither case will the
rules of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness.
Just as the competition will not be postponed to await the
athlete’s recovery, so the prohibition of banned substance will
not be lifted in recognition of its accidental absorption. The
vicissitudes of competition, like those of life generally, may
create many types of unfairness, whether by accident or the
negligence of unaccountable persons, which the law cannot
repair. . . . Furthermore, it appears to be a laudable policy
objective not to repair an accidental unfairness to an
individual by creating an intentional unfairness to the whole
body of other competitors. This is what would happen if
banned performance-enhancing substances were tolerated
when absorbed inadvertently. Moreover, it is likely that even
intentional abuse would in many cases escape sanction for
lack of proof of guilty intent. And it is certain that a
requirement of intent would invite costly litigation that may
well cripple federations . . . . 23
That pillar, upon which anti-doping control stands, remains in place today.
Although it is clear that strict liability is of fundamental importance in antidoping policies, it has come as no surprise that strict liability has been aided in
recent years by further provisions that have filled in the gaps left by strict
liability. Quite obviously, without the smoking gun of a failed drug test, strict

21. Id. at ¶ 1.
22. For example, Alain Baxter and Andrea Raducan both lost Olympic medals, while arguably
being blameless for the failed tests that caused the loss of those medals.
23. USA Shooting, CAS 94/A/129, ¶¶ 14–15.
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liability is a weapon incapable of finding its target. This weakness was best
demonstrated in the events surrounding the Bay Area Laboratory CoOperative (BALCO) scandal. 24 If a sporting authority does not have an
effective test for a performance-enhancing substance, then strict liability
becomes irrelevant. This was the problem that the sporting authorities faced
with the existence of tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) before any test became
available. The remedy for this lacuna was as predictable as it was effective.
Nonanalytical positives were used to great effect in securing convictions
against those benefitting from the “undetectable,” artificially-created,
performance-enhancing drugs. 25
The case brought against Michelle Collins by the United States AntiDoping Agency (USADA) on December 10, 2004 was one of the first attempts
by an anti-doping agency to secure a conviction against an athlete for taking
performance-enhancing substances without the existence of a positive test. 26
The fact that the ruling by the arbitration panel went against Collins was not
contentious. The USADA panel pointed out that there was substantial
evidence against Collins, which included documents seized from BALCO,
incriminating e-mails, and suspicious, although not positive, blood and urine
tests at different IOC accredited laboratories over several years. 27
The significance of nonanalytical positives, as a further pillar upon which
doping control stands, cannot be underestimated. Although a relatively new
weapon in the armory of sporting authorities, nonanalytical positives have
seen significant developments. Richard McLaren has commented that “[p]rior
to the cases arising from the BALCO affair, non-analytical positive cases
before [the] CAS primarily involved an apparent manipulation or
contamination of a sample given by an athlete as part of the doping control
sample collection process.” 28 Any attempted manipulation or contamination
of an athlete’s sample is considered a doping offense, readily proven without
the necessity of establishing the purity of the sample itself. 29
24. The Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) scandal was an attempt to create the
world’s fastest human being through the design and then use of artificially created, undetectable
steroids. The project succeeded when Tim Montgomery broke the world 100m record in September
2002 running a time of 9.78 seconds. See generally U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS
2004/O/645, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2005).
25. Tim Montgomery, Dwain Chambers, Chryste Gaines, Michelle Collins, Marion Jones, and
Kelli White were just some of the athletes caught up in the BALCO scandal. See infra note 118.
26. See generally U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190
00658 04 (N. Am. CAS Panel Dec. 10, 2004).
27. Id. ¶ 1.2.
28. Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and Circumstantial Evidence
Cases in Sports, 16 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (2006).
29. Id. at 196.
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Article 2.2 of the Code makes it clear that use or attempted use of a
prohibited substance is a doping violation. 30 Perhaps the most obvious
example of a successful action against an athlete charged with interfering with
her sample was brought against Irish swimmer Michelle Smith de Bruin. 31 In
making clear the appropriate burden of proof, the CAS explained,
In essence, the Appellant contended that the burden of proof
lay upon the Respondent to eliminate all possibilities other
than manipulation by the Appellant. We do not believe that
this position reflects a correct legal analysis.
The
Respondent’s burden was only, but sufficiently, to make the
Panel “comfortably satisfied” that the Appellant was the
culprit. 32
The justification for the adoption of this standard, rather than one of
beyond a reasonable doubt, was expressed by the CAS as being necessary to
avoid applying standards appropriate in the “public law of the state [rather
than] the private law of an association.” 33 This standard has been specifically
identified as being appropriate in cases involving personal reputation and
professional misconduct and, as such, with one or two reservations identified
elsewhere in this article, would appear to be appropriate for anti-doping
incidents such as those being discussed. 34 Further, it is this standard that has
been adopted by WADA and therefore applies to anti-doping cases in general,
and in particular, to Claudia Pechstein’s biological passport case. Indeed,
when Pechstein challenged the application of this standard, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal (SFT) opined,
The view of the Arbitral Tribunal that the Respondent must
prove a doping [offense] “to the comfortable satisfaction of
the hearing panel” does not violate public policy but refers to
the allocation of the burden of proof and the standard of
evidence which, in the area of application of private law—
even where disciplinary measures of private sporting
[organizations] are under review—cannot be determined from
30. WADA CODE art. 2.2.
31. See generally B. v. Féd’n Int’l de Natation, CAS 98/A/211, (June 7, 1999) (de Bruin was
found guilty of tampering with her urine sample given during an out-of-competition test).
32. Id. ¶¶ 39–40.
33. Id. ¶ 26 (citing N., J., Y., & W. v. Féd’n Int’l de Natation, CAS 98/A/208, ¶ 13 (Dec. 22,
1998).
34. See Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04, ¶ 3.4.
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the perspective of criminal law concepts such as the
presumption of innocence or the principles of “in dubio pro
reo” or on the basis of the guarantees which result from the
ECHR. Even with respect to her [defense] that the standard of
evidence on which the decision was based leads to disregard
of the principle of proportionality, the Appellant does not
point out a violation of public policy. 35
This article will first briefly explain the nature of the biological passport
and why it represents a significant evolutionary development in the fight
against doping in sports. This article will then go on to analyze, in detail, the
first case brought to CAS using the biological passport, specifically against
German speed skater Claudia Pechstein. The article will then shift to
Pechstein’s unsuccessful appeal to the SFT against her conviction and will
move on to consider her request for revision of that decision back to the SFT.
This piece will end with a brief consideration of the position that the passport
may prove to be part of the armory of measures available to the anti-doping
organizations, which raises the question of whether it may lead to a
fundamental shift in the emphasis of the war on doping in sports.
II. THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT
The biological passport is an individual electronic record of blood and
urine tests taken from sports participants over an extended period of time. 36
These tests enable an individual hematological profile to be created, which
consists of a number of different hematological parameters. 37 The principle
behind the passport is that certain drugs have an impact on these parameters,
either raising them or lowering them, and therefore making it possible to
detect doping without the necessity of a failed drug test. 38 The individualized
nature of the profiles increases the sensitivity of the passport, effectively using
the athlete’s own physiology as a base rather than population norms, as is the
case with conventional drugs tests. 39

35. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Feb. 10, 2010, 4A_612/2009 (Switz.), ¶ 6.3.2.
36. Biological Passport – Questions/Answers, UNION CYCLISTE INT’L, http://www.uci.ch/
templates/ UCI/UCI2/layout.asp?MenuId=MTU4ODY&LangId=1 (last visited June 21, 2011).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Athlete Biological Passport, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.wadaama.org/en/Science-Medicine/Athlete-Biological-Passport/ (last updated Dec. 2009); Biological
Passport – Questions/Answers, supra note 36.
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The SFT’s recent ruling in Pechstein v. International Skating Union 40 ,
which confirmed the decision of the CAS against Pechstein, 41 seems to have
added yet another string to the bow of the sporting authorities against doping
users. Although the International Skating Union (ISU) has been at the
forefront of the development of the biological passport, it is not the only
international sporting authority that has been pushing the development of the
technology. The International Cycling Union (UCI) introduced its own
biological passport at the start of the 2008 season. 42 After some initial
problems and disagreements with WADA, which at one point led WADA to
withdraw its support for UCI’s program, 43 the UCI declared that five cyclists
needed to respond to doping allegations after submitting abnormal results
under the new testing program. 44 Thus, WADA imposed the first sanction of
a sports participant caught using the biological passport on May 28, 2010,
which led to its Director General stating that
“The Athlete Biological Passport adds a powerful tool to
support the fight against doping in sport . . . . Coupled with
other strategies, it makes prohibited preparations harder to
implement by those athletes who may take the risk to cheat.
We know that the effects of some substances remain
detectable in the body longer than the substances themselves.
The Athlete Biological Passport Model allows the anti-doping
community to exploit this reality through a similar approach
to that used in forensic science. . . . We look forward to seeing
more anti-doping organizations follow in the UCI’s footsteps
and implement such longitudinal follow-up programs in the
comings [sic] months and years.” 45
The UCI followed the sanction with notable success with the CAS, which
40. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009.
41. See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1912 &
Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V.v v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1913 (Nov. 25,
2009).
42. See Has Peloton Cleaned Up Its Act or Will Dirty Tactics Prevail?, SUN. TIMES (London)
(July 4, 2008) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/more_sport/cycling/article4264752.ece.
43. Julien Pretot, WADA Withdraws Support for UCI Biological Passport, REUTERS (Mar. 27,
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2784271420080327.
44. Gregor Brown, UCI Names First Five Biological Passport Violators, CYCLING NEWS (June
17, 2009), http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/uci-names-first-five-biological-passport-violators.
45. WADA Welcomes First Athlete Biological Passport Sanction, WADA, (May 28, 2010),
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/News-Center/Articles/WADA-Welcomes-First-Athlete-BiologicalPassport-Sanction/.

CHARLISH (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/21/2011 2:17 PM

THE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT

69

confirmed the rigor of the biological passport in detecting doping violations,
which was highlighted in recent decisions rendered by the CAS against Pietro
Caucchioli, 46 Franco Pellizotti, 47 and Tadej Valjavec. 48
On December 1, 2009, WADA approved new Athlete Biological Passport
Operating Guidelines, which stated very clearly that “[t]he fundamental
principle of the Athlete Biological Passport is based on the monitoring of an
athlete’s biological variables over time to facilitate indirect detection of
doping on a longitudinal basis, rather than on the traditional direct detection of
doping.” 49
At the same time, in the United Kingdom, several British athletes were
placed on the biological passport program, which required them to submit
blood samples throughout their careers. 50 The key to the biological passport
lies not in what it tests, but how it tests, as Professor David Cowan 51
commented:
“This new [program] will compare the athlete with himself or
herself rather than against the population at large. The effect
of this will make it far easier to catch the doped athlete. We
believe that this will act as a powerful deterrent for the good
of all healthy athletes and maintain the integrity of sport.” 52
The notion of effectively measuring against the athlete’s own physiology
rather than standard population norms is nothing new. A similar provision
was explained in Collins as being critical in the finding of guilt, with reference
to levels of testosterone and epitestosterone. 53 The USADA Panel stated,
A normal T/E ratio is 1/1, although the specific ratio will vary
from person to person. The [Code] sets an abnormal T/E ratio
at 6/1, which is above what one would expect normally to
46. See generally Caucchioli v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano & Union Cycliste
Internationale, CAS 2010/A/2178 (Mar. 8, 2011) (unofficial translation of original French text).
47. See generally Pellizotti v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano & Union Cycliste
Internationale, TAS 2010/A/2308 & Union Cycliste Internationale v. Pellizotti, Federazione Ciclistica
Italiana, & Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, TAS 2011, 2011/A/2335 (June 14, 2011).
48. See generally Union Cycliste Internationale v. Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235 (Apr. 21, 2011).
49. Athlete Biological Passport, supra note 39.
50. See U.K. Anti-Doping Introduces Athlete Biological Passport, U.K. ANTI-DOPING,
http://www.ukad.org.uk/ news/athlete-biological-passport (last visited June 28, 2010).
51. Director of the King’s College London Drug Control Centre, the only accredited anti-doping
laboratory in the United Kingdom.
52. U.K. Anti-Doping Introduces Athlete Biological Passport, supra note 50.
53. See Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04, ¶ 2.3.
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occur. Regardless of a person’s own baseline ratio, his or her
ratio will generally stay consistent, with a normal variation in
women of up to 60%. The variation in Collins’s T/E ratio in
2003 alone, on the other hand, was more than 1000%. 54
Despite the obvious benefits that may be derived from focusing testing on
athletes against themselves, which were explained in Collins and are very
much a feature of the biological passport, the administration of the passport
scheme itself has not been universally welcomed by all of those involved in
the fight against doping. In what may be seen as more of an attack on the UCI
rather than on the biological passport, Pierre Bordry, 55 at a recent anti-doping
symposium, stated, “‘I [do not] think the biological passport is useful . . . .
What we need is neutral information on biological data. And we need a
biological passport that is absolutely transparent to target riders. Everybody
should deserve the same treatment.’” 56
It is apparent, however, that the biological passport is here to stay. In
Pechstein, 57 CAS confirmed its satisfaction with the technology and its
practice, a decision that the SFT affirmed. 58
III. CAS 2009/A/1912 CLAUDIA PECHSTEIN V. INTERNATIONAL SKATING
UNION
A. Background
Claudia Pechstein has been competing at the elite level of speed skating
since 1988. 59 During that time, she has taken part in five Olympic Games,
winning five gold, and numerous other medals during her career. 60 As has
already been stated, along with the UCI, the ISU has been at the forefront of
developing the biological passport to combat doping in its respective sport.
Both organizations adopted the biological passport measure before it received
54. Id. ¶ 4.18.
55. French Anti-Doping Agency President
56. Samuel Petrequin, French Anti-Doping Agency President Pierre Bordry Criticizes UCI’s
Biological Passport, THE GAEA TIMES (June 10, 2010), http://blog.taragana.com/business/
2010/06/10/french-anti-doping-agency-president-pierre-bordry-criticizes-ucis-biological-passport69294/.
57. See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf
Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913.
58. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009.
59. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 1.
60. Id.
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formal backing from WADA, and it was against this background that blood
samples from Pechstein were analyzed and found to display evidence of a
possible doping violation, which became the subject of first, a case brought to
the CAS, 61 and then second, the final appeal to the SFT. 62
For a period of just over nine years, running from February 2000 until
April 2009, Pechstein, in common with many other skaters of her caliber,
underwent numerous drug tests, and, during this time, she never once failed
any such test. 63 Over ninety blood samples were collected from her to be used
to aid development of her biological passport. 64 Collection of these samples
accelerated between October 2007 and April 2009, with twenty-seven samples
collected, including twelve in the final four months of that period. 65 The CAS
explained the parameters that are measured from the samples:
The blood parameters [that] are measured and recorded within
the scope of the Respondent’s blood profiling program
include inter alia hemoglobin, hematocrit and percentage of
reticulocytes, (“%retics”). Reticulocytes are immature red
blood cells that are released from the bone marrow. The
%retics is a sensitive hematological parameter which provides
a real-time assessment of the functional state of
erythropoiesis 66 in a person’s organism. 67
It was on the percentage of reticulocytes that Pechstein’s readings proved
to be problematic. The CAS pointed out that the ISU considered that normal
values fell between 0.4 and 2.4. 68 Although Pechstein’s profile, which
resulted from her blood samples in isolation, may not have been particularly
serious, it was the pattern produced that proved to be damning. Just one day
before a major championship, a sample taken on February 6, 2009 showed a
%retic reading of 3.49. 69 Two more readings were taken on the first day of

61. See generally id.
62. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009.
63. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 5.
64. Id. ¶ 6.
65. Id.
66. Red blood cell production—a very important feature for endurance athletes in particular.
67. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 7.
68. Id. ¶ 8. This was disputed by Pechstein; however, Pechstein’s criticism of this interpretation
was rejected by the CAS.
69. Id. ¶ 9.
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the championship, and those readings were 3.54 and 3.38, respectively. 70 Just
over a week later, another sample was taken, which showed that her reading
had dropped to 1.37. 71 By that time, Pechstein was an athlete approaching the
veteran stage of her career, a time when a natural decline may be expected in
her performance. Further concerns were also raised about the frequency with
which Pechstein had changed her “whereabouts” 72 in January and February of
2009. Pechstein’s movement made it very difficult to apply any “out-ofcompetition” testing on her. 73 Following a review of Pechstein’s profile on
March 5, 2009, the ISU accused her of violating Article 2.2 of its anti-doping
code, 74 which conformed to the new WADA code that came into effect
January 1, 2009. 75 The ISU Disciplinary Committee subsequently imposed a
two-year ban on Pechstein, commencing February 9, 2009, which Pechstein
then appealed to the CAS. 76
Pechstein, unsurprisingly, denied the allegations, citing concerns about the
timings involved in the procedure. 77 She pointed out that, despite being tested
on numerous occasions, she had never failed a drug test. 78 She also suggested
that she had not given her express written permission or consent to use any
evidence of blood doping. 79 She stressed her position that the ISU had not
complied with relevant WADA standards on testing, chain of custody, or
documentation of results. 80 Perhaps her most significant defense, however,
certainly from the perspective of the future use of the biological passport, was
her assertion that the upper limit for %retics proscribed by the ISU (i.e., 2.4)
was far too low, and that it was perfectly normal for a healthy woman to have
a reading fluctuating between 0.8 and 4.1%retics. 81 Further, Pechstein
asserted that her %retics readings had always remained above the 0.5 that

70. Id. ¶ 10.
71. Id. ¶¶ 8–11.
72. There is a requirement upon an elite sports participant to provide whereabouts for one hour
each day, between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. for the purposes of out-of-competition testing.
73. See Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913 at ¶ 68.
74. Namely using the prohibited method of blood doping in violation of article 2.2, (Use or
attempted use by an athlete of a prohibited method or prohibited substance). See id. ¶ 12.
75. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009 at 3.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 48.
78. Id. ¶ 46.
79. Id. ¶ 47.
80. Id. ¶ 48.
81. Id. ¶ 49.
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should normally be expected following a period of erythropoietin abuse. 82
She also questioned the accuracy of the machine used to measure the %retics
and the reliability of the sampling. 83 Moreover, Pechstein also cast doubt
upon the accuracy of the %retics measurement when set in context of both her
hemoglobin and hematocrit levels. 84 In short, she questioned the reliability
and accuracy of the whole procedure around the samples taken for the
longitudinal testing, which led to her violation of the ISU anti-doping code.
Her final point related to the burden of proof to be expected of the ISU in
proving a doping violation. She suggested, as the CAS pointed out, “that the
ISU must convince the Panel to a level very close to ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’ that all alternative causes for the increase of %retics can be excluded
and that, additionally, the [a]thlete had an intention to use blood doping.” 85
In contrast, it was the ISU’s contention that because Pechstein had been
charged with use of a prohibited substance or method rather than attempted
use, under Article 2.2 of the ISU anti-doping regulations, it was unnecessary
for ISU to prove any such intent to use blood doping. 86
Following confirmation that the CAS had jurisdiction to hear and decide
the dispute, pursuant to Article R47 of the CAS Code and Article 13.2.1 of the
ISU anti-doping regulations, 87 the CAS went on to explain that in accordance
with Article R57 of the CAS Code, “[t]he Panel shall have full power to
review the facts and the law.” 88 This meant, of course, that the panel could
look at the case in detail rather than just examine the correctness of the
original decision, looking at both procedural and substantive issues. 89 This
was especially important as new issues for the CAS were being examined with
the reliability of the biological passport program. Pechstein, it should not be
forgotten had not failed any drugs tests, neither in competition nor out of
competition. 90 There was some relevant precedent from the United States, 91
as was pointed out by the Panel, 92 but nevertheless these were new issues for
82. Id. ¶ 50.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 52.
85. Id. ¶ 53.
86. See id. ¶ 69.
87. See id. ¶¶ 71–72.
88. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT CODE R57 (2011) [hereinafter CAS CODE].
89. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 79.
90. See id. ¶ 46.
91. See generally Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04.
92. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 78 (citing Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04).
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the CAS.
An interesting argument raised by Pechstein related to, as she saw it, her
lack of consent to the use, by the ISU, of her blood samples as evidence of
blood doping. 93 In raising this point, Pechstein seemed to be suggesting one
of two possible arguments. The first being that the ISU rules were unclear as
to whether her samples could be used to test for blood doping, and, therefore,
any perceived ambiguity should be resolved in accordance with the decision in
Wilander v. Tobin, 94 which is construed in favor of the athlete. This issue was
not explored, as Pechstein instead concentrated on the argument that there was
a clear lack of agreement that her samples should be used in the manner that
the ISU had used them. In Pechstein’s case, the CAS concluded on this
particular issue:
Ms[.] Pechstein has been participating in “international
activities” for more than two decades. In willingly registering
for international skating competitions sanctioned by the ISU,
she obviously expressed her acceptance of ISU rules and
regulations, including the ISU [Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR)]. . . . When they accede to competition, athletes cannot
pick and choose the rules they like; accordingly, the Panel
finds that Ms. Pechstein has been at all times during her
international career under an obligation to comply with all
ISU regulations, including all applicable anti-doping rules. 95
Additionally, Pechstein’s agreement with the anti-doping rules was
reinforced by the fact that she never objected to any sample collection, and,
further, she actually signed each form or barcode used to identify her own
particular blood samples. 96 The CAS could discern no ambiguity in ISU’s
anti-doping regulations and, to the contrary, stressed that
Article 6.2 of the ISU ADR expressly authorizes the ISU to
use blood samples to “detect” a prohibited method and more
specifically, to create a profile from the relevant parameters in
a skater’s blood “for [a]nti-[d]oping purposes”
thus
including a finding of “use” under Article 2.2 of the ISU

93. See id. ¶ 95.
94. See generally Wilander v. Tobin & Jude, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 293 (Eng.).
95. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶¶ 98–99.
96. Id. ¶ 137.
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ADR. 97
The CAS’ position was further reinforced by the WADA guidelines on
blood sample collection, which state that such longitudinal profiling can be
used for “anti doping purposes in accordance with Article 2.2 of the Code.” 98
Pechstein also raised concerns about using blood profiling to prove an
anti-doping violation, suggesting that it was only on January 1, 2009, that the
new WADA and ISU anti-doping regulations came into force and that the use
of longitudinal profiling for this purpose was expressly stated in the ISU
ADR. 99 She therefore suggested that using any of her samples prior to that
date would effectively amount to retroactive punishment, 100 which is
forbidden by the ISU ADR and also by Swiss law, under which the CAS and
the ISU operate. The CAS, however, clearly stated that Pechstein’s
longitudinal profile (i.e., her biological passport) provided sufficient evidence
for a breach of Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR, and that this interpretation was
perfectly possible under both the old and the new ISU ADR. 101 The 2009 ISU
ADR made it clear that an anti-doping violation under Article 2.2, “Use or
Any Use,” could always be demonstrated by “any reliable evidentiary means”
under the old or the new regulations, and, therefore, there was no concern
about any issues of retroactive punishment. 102
Interestingly, the CAS further emphasized that the only concerns with
regard to the use of old samples may be if the samples fall outside the
appropriate eight-year limitation period. As the CAS stated, “[a]s long as the
substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as doping is in force prior to the
conduct, the resort to a new evidentiary method does not constitute a case of
retrospective application of the law.” 103
This rule has to be appropriate with the offense clearly defined and the
samples collected. This in no way could be viewed as retroactive punishment,
but merely a necessity for further scientific analysis using more complex and
up-to-date methods on samples already collected. This approach was later
confirmed in Caucchioli v. CONI, where the CAS reiterated that the biological
passport
97. Id. ¶ 101.
98. Id. ¶ 102.
99. Id. ¶ 104 (citing ISU ADR 5.3.1).
100. Id. ¶ 47.
101. Id. ¶ 107.
102. Id. It was also pointed out that her readings prior to January 1, 2009 were used only to
assist in interpreting the samples from February 2009, which were the relevant samples in proving her
anti-doping violation under Article 2.2. Id. ¶ 109.
103. Id. ¶ 109.
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represents only a new method for screening of blood doping,
already prohibited by other standards.
New scientific
methods . . . may be used at any time to prove that past
abuses, with the only restrictions on the term of use samples
for the fight against doping (set at eight years) and the
beginning disciplinary procedures in a timely manner. . . .
Therefore, the use of new methods do not constitute a case of
retroactive application of standards . . . . 104
What was rightly of more concern to the CAS was the question of whether
longitudinal blood profiling could be interpreted as a “reliable means” for
testing. Was the scientific basis of longitudinal profiling sufficiently robust to
enable a clear and categorical judgment of whether an anti-doping violation
under Article 2.2 had taken place? This fundamental point, the CAS
suggested, could be broken down into five distinct questions, each of which
must be proven: (1) Were the relevant blood samples properly taken?; (2) Was
there a reliable chain of custody of the samples from collection to the
laboratory?; (3)Was the analysis machine accurate and reliable?; (4) Was the
transmission of the samples to and from their storage in the ISU data base
reliable?; and (5) Was it clear that “the hematological values of Ms[.]
Pechstein are reliable evidence of her use of a prohibited method in violation
of Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR?” 105
It was made clear by the CAS that no presumption should be made about
the reliability of the analysis machine; 106 that they were satisfied that the
samples were properly collected; 107 that the number of tests analyzed was
appropriate; 108 that the chain of custody was safe, secure, and scientifically
sound; 109 and that the analysis machine and methods of analysis were reliable.
It was made clear that all of the aforementioned questions had to be, and could
be, established according to the appropriate standard of proof. It was
confirmed by the CAS that this case involved an offense of strict liability,
meaning that no fault or negligence in the commission of the anti-doping
violation had to be proven by the ISU on the part of Pechstein. 110

104. Caucchioli, 2010/A/2178, ¶¶ 33–34.
105. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 113.
106. Id. ¶ 114.
107. Id. ¶ 138.
108. Id. ¶ 180.
109. Id. ¶ 148.
110. Id. ¶ 119 (citing ISU ADR 2.2.1, 2.2.2).
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The more interesting question concerned the appropriate standard of proof
that was required to demonstrate the doping violation. Pechstein asserted,
bearing in mind the particular seriousness of the allegation against her, that the
allegation needs to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 111 However, the
CAS emphasized that the appropriate standard was that of “comfortable
satisfaction . . . bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation” as per the
ISU ADR. 112
This measure had been adopted by WADA in 2003 and has been
examined in some detail in case law since. It was reported in Collins 113 that
the standard originated from “court decisions in Australia and other
Commonwealth countries that created a standard for cases involving personal
reputation more stringent than [the] balance of probabilities but less
burdensome than beyond a reasonable doubt.” 114
Like the Pechstein case, the case of Michelle Collins also involved an
athlete accused of doping but had not actually failed a drug test. Evidence
from e-mail correspondence and analysis of blood and urine samples displayed
tell-tale signs of doping by Collins. 115 In at least this respect, it can be
suggested that the two cases bear striking similarities. However, in Pechstein,
the comfortable satisfaction standard was breached without the benefit of a
trail of damning e-mail evidence. Rather, in Pechstein, there was data from
Pechstein’s blood samples to rely upon. 116 The link between the professional
misconduct cases involving personal reputation, as alluded to above, is the
forerunner to the imposed standard, and, thus, cases involving doping in
sports, perhaps, invite some caution. Reputation lost through a professional
misconduct case will invariably have consequences only at a local level and is
unlikely to have significant impact beyond one’s own domestic and
professional life. However, for a high-profile athlete to be found guilty of a
doping offense, with or without the smoking gun of a failed test, has grave
consequences at a domestic level and goes far beyond to a national and
international level. This impact will also encroach beyond an athlete’s
immediate professional environment. A “drug cheat” will lose the chance to
earn income in related industries, such as coaching or media work. Likewise,
publicity surrounding his or her “conviction” is likely to be of national or

111. Id. ¶ 53.
112. Id. ¶ 123 (quoting ISU ADR 3.1).
113. See generally Collins, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N No. 30 190 00658 04.
114. Id. ¶ 3.4.
115. Id. ¶ 4.3.
116. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶ 210.
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international interest, and, therefore, the damage to his or her reputation may
be that much more severe. Thus, it is crucial that the comfortable satisfaction
test truly does reflect these circumstances. Just as negligence in sports is
predicated on the importance of ordinary negligence taking into account all the
circumstances, 117 it is important in the world of anti-doping that the
circumstances remain fundamental. Where the consequences of a guilty
verdict are potentially more severe, then the burden of proof should rise to
reflect these more serious consequences. The fact that this notion has been
expressly acknowledged in several cases 118 should reassure those who may be
concerned that there is the potential to find an athlete guilty and to impose a
significant penalty by merely overcoming a burden of proof, which may, at
first glance, appear to be very low. This is not the case, particularly when the
serious consequences and impact on the level of proof that any panel may
require to demonstrate a doping violation are both taken into consideration.
Significantly, the standard of comfortable satisfaction has also withstood
scrutiny from the SFT. 119
Therefore, the key issue is being able to define the limits of what may be
meant by comfortable satisfaction. On paper, it appears to be at the midway
point between the civil burden of balance of probabilities and the criminal
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the reality may be
somewhat different. This particular argument was rehearsed in the cases of
United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines 120 and in United States AntiDoping Agency v. Montgomery. 121 In Gaines, CAS almost seemed to dismiss
concern about the appropriate standard of proof to be applied, suggesting,
As often becomes evident when the question of standard of
proof is debated, the debate looms larger in theory than
practice. . . . In all cases the degree of probability must be
commensurate with and proportionate to those allegations; the
more serious the allegation the higher the degree of
probability, or “comfort” required. That is because, in
general, the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that
117. See Caldwell v. MaGuire, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1054 (Eng.), ¶ 39.
118. See generally Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf
Gemeinschaft e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913; Arbitral Award, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines, CAS
2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 2005); Arbitral Award, Edwards v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns, CAS OG
04/003 (Aug. 17, 2004); Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645.
119. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 3 (It is the standard adopted by the WADA and is laid out
clearly in Article 3 of the 2009 WADA Code).
120. See generally Arbitral Award, Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649.
121. See generally Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645.
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the alleged event occurred and, hence, the stronger the
evidence required before the occurrence of the event is
demonstrated to be more probable than not. 122
The CAS Panel made the point in Gaines that at times, allegations may be
grave and have very harsh consequences, such as the loss of livelihood and
reputation, and because these allegations would have very severe
consequences if proven means that for the CAS to be comfortably satisfied,
the evidence and proof must be very clear. Under such circumstances, the
CAS suggested that the practical difference between beyond reasonable doubt
and comfortable satisfaction was minimal. In Gaines, the CAS concluded on
this matter:
From this perspective, and in view of the nature and gravity of
the allegations at issue in these proceedings, there is no
practical distinction between the standards of proof advocated
by USADA and the Respondents. It makes little, if indeed
any, difference whether a “beyond reasonable doubt” or
“comfortable satisfaction” standard is applied to determine the
claims against the Respondents. 123
This argument bears the hallmarks presented in the English football
hooliganism case of Gough v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire. 124 In Gough,
the appellant argued that if a banning order 125 was a punishment then it must
be predicated on a beyond reasonable doubt burden of proof rather than
reasonable belief as outlined in the legislation. 126 The English court dismissed
this argument, suggesting that the standard to be applied, which would have
been familiar to both Pechstein and Gaines, would be practically
indistinguishable from the criminal, beyond reasonable doubt standard. Lord
Phillips MR commented on such banning orders:
While technically the civil standard of proof applies, that
standard is flexible and must reflect the consequences that will

122. Arbitral Award, Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, ¶36.
123. Id.
124. See generally Gough v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA (Civ) 351 (Eng.).
125. A penalty imposed upon football fans that could prevent them from travelling abroad or
from the vicinity of particular football grounds if the court was satisfied that there were reasonable
grounds for believing that making a banning order would help prevent violence or disorder at a
regulated football match. See id. ¶ 86.
126. See id. ¶ 41; see generally Football Spectators Act of 1989 (Eng. 2002).
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follow if the case for a banning order is made out. This
should lead the [justices] to apply an exacting standard of
proof that will, in practice, be hard to distinguish from the
criminal standard . . . . In practice the “reasonable grounds”
will almost inevitably consist of evidence of past conduct. . . .
Those requirements, if properly applied in the manner
described above, will provide a satisfactory threshold for the
making of a banning order. 127
One may question whether this reasonable satisfaction standard, albeit one
that in the English court’s mind is apparently similar to the criminal standard,
is sufficiently rigorous when set against the severity of any drug ban. A guilty
verdict obtained through use of the biological passport will almost certainly be
able to demonstrate a pattern of drug abuse, whereas a failed test merely
demonstrates that the athlete was guilty on that particular occasion. Therefore,
with this in mind, a pattern of abuse will clearly be viewed as more serious
than any single transgression. It is also more likely that such a pattern of
abuse will fall foul of aggravating circumstances outlined in Article 10.6 of the
Code. 128 Comment to Article 10.6 in the Code states,
Examples of aggravating circumstances which may justify the
imposition of a period of Ineligibility greater than the standard
sanction are: the Athlete or other Person committed the antidoping rule violation as part of a doping plan or scheme,
either individually or involving a conspiracy or common
enterprise to commit anti-doping rule violations; the Athlete
or other Person Used or Possessed multiple Prohibited
Substances or Prohibited Methods or Used or Possessed a
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method on multiple
occasions . . . . 129
This is, by no means, a definitive list of circumstances that may lead to a
finding of aggravating circumstances. It is clear, however, that use of a
prohibited method or substance on multiple occasions will be enough to satisfy
Article 10.6 of the Code. It is also clear that the use of the biological passport
is much more likely to detect multiple uses than in-competition or out-ofcompetition testing. Does this raise questions of equity in the Code,

127. Gough, ¶¶ 90, 92–93.
128. See generally WADA CODE art. 10.6.
129. WADA CODE art. 10.6 cmt.
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particularly when there has not been a universal adoption of the biological
passport in all sports governed by the Code? Should the burden of proof
remain, overtly at least, one of reasonable satisfaction when the consequences
are potentially much more serious for the athlete running afoul through the
biological passport standard than through more conventional testing?
In Claudia Pechstein’s case, the CAS confirmed that she was guilty of a
doping violation according to Article 2.2 of the ISU ADR, and, pursuant to
Article 10.2 of the same regulations, she was declared ineligible from
competition for two years. 130
B. The Appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal 131
Following Pechstein’s defeat with the CAS, she launched her final appeal
in the SFT. 132 In her submission, the major thrust of her appeal was that the
CAS Secretary General and other unnamed third parties had unfairly
influenced the CAS decision. 133 Pechstein was denied an extensive judicial
review of the CAS decision in line with appropriate federal statutes, which
restrict the scope of judicial review of international arbitration proceedings. 134
In a ruling that proved fairly damning to Pechstein’s appeal, the SFT
resoundingly rejected her challenge of the factual findings by the CAS,
reporting, “[a]t various points as in her further grounds for appeal, [Pechstein]
deviates from the factual findings of the CAS or widens them without
asserting any substantiated exceptions to the binding character of the factual
findings. To that extent, her submissions must remain unheeded.” 135
Pechstein’s attempts to introduce new evidence were also similarly
rejected, 136 with the SFT stressing that this in no way violated her right to be
heard. 137 “[I]n arbitration proceedings, as in civil proceedings, the parties
cannot submit new allegations and evidence at any time and without
restriction. This does not constitute a violation of the right to be heard but is

130. Arbitral Award, Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 & Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft
e.V.v., CAS 2009/A/1913, ¶¶ 211–214.
131. See generally Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009.
132. The CAS is based in Lausanne and the Swiss Federal Tribunal acts as the final Court of
Appeal for decisions rendered by the CAS.
133. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009 at 7.
134. Id. ¶ 2.4.1.
135. Id. ¶ 2.4.2 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. ¶ 5.2.
137. See LOI FÉDÉRAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP] [FED. CODE ON PRIVATE
INT’L LAW] [CPIL] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 190(2)(d) (Switz.).
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in line with generally [recognized] procedural principles.” 138
The main thrust of Pechstein’s appeal, however, concerned the CAS itself
and its independence. 139 She based an interesting argument around the
inevitable and, as she saw it, negative outcome of her CAS hearing. Pechstein
suggested that there was clear pressure on the IOC to prove its opposition to
doping to its major sponsors, and, in order to accomplish this goal, the CAS
needed to demonstrate the accuracy and reliability of the doping passport. 140
Therefore, Pechstein suggested that being found guilty by the CAS was
unsurprising and that her guilty verdict was greeted enthusiastically by the
IOC Vice President, who stated, “‘the decision of the CAS shows that sports
law is opening up more possibilities in the fight against doping in athletes than
state law was ever able to.’” 141
The thrust of the appeal appears to have been an attempt to reignite a
debate that had been settled as far back as 1992 in an appeal from a CAS
decision, 142 which was subsequently appealed to the SFT in March 1993. 143
In that case, a horse jockey was initially suspended for three months and fined
when his horse tested positive for a banned substance, which he then appealed
to the CAS. 144 At arbitration, the CAS reduced the suspension to just one
month. 145 However, despite the reduction, the jockey appealed the decision to
the SFT, alleging that the CAS was not sufficiently impartial and independent
due to its close relationship, including financing, with the IOC. 146 Although
the SFT dismissed this case, it noted its concern that there were numerous
links between the CAS and the IOC: the CAS was financed almost entirely by
the IOC, the IOC had authority to modify the CAS statutes, and the IOC
retained a large degree of influence in appointing the CAS arbitrators. 147 The
SFT commented, in obiter,
[C]ertain objections with regard to the independence of the

138. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 5.2.
139. See Caucchioli, 2010/A/2178, ¶¶ 45–47 (Pietro Caucchioli attempted unsuccessfully to
highlight the lack of impartiality of the experts used by the UCI to analyze data for the biological
passport).
140. See Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 3.1.1.
141. Id.
142. See generally Gundel v. Int’l Equestrian Fed’n, CAS 92/A/63 (Sept. 10, 1992).
143. See generally Gundel v. Int’l Equestrian Fed’n, FT 1993 RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU TAS
[DIGEST OF COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT AWARDS] (1986–1998), at 561.
144. Id. at 563.
145. Id. at 564.
146. See id. at 569–70.
147. See id.
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CAS could not be set aside without another form of process,
in particular those based on the organic and economic ties
existing between the CAS and the IOC. In fact the latter is
competent to modify the CAS Statute; it also bears the
operating cost of this court and plays a considerable role in the
appointment of its members. 148
The CAS has taken to discuss its own history, noting,
In the view of the [SFT], such links would have been
sufficient seriously to call into question the independence of
the CAS in the event of the IOC’s being a party to
proceedings before it. The [SFT’s] message was thus
perfectly clear: the CAS had to be made more independent of
the IOC both [organizationally] and financially. 149
Following this criticism of the relationship between the CAS and IOC, the
CAS made changes to its constitution with the aim of remedying the obiter
comments of the SFT. 150
It was not until May 2003 that the issue of the impartiality of the CAS was
examined in detail by the SFT and these changes were tested. 151 The case
involved two Russian cross-country skiers 152 who finished first and second,
respectively, in the five-kilometer pursuit event at the 2002 Winter
Olympics. 153 Although they passed their doping tests immediately after the
event, both subsequently failed a later test following another cross-country
event at the same Olympic Games. 154 The athlete who finished third in the
pursuit event appealed to CAS and was awarded the gold medal. 155 The
Russian skiers took their case to the SFT, and the SFT proceeded to dissect the
relationship between the IOC and the CAS and examine the impartiality of the
CAS, concluding that the CAS was not

148. Id.
149. History of the CAS, COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/
infogenerales. asp/4-3-236-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
150. See Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] May 27, 2003, 4P_267–70/2002, ¶ 3.3.1.
(Switz.).
151. See generally id.
152. Olga Danilova and Larissa Lazutina
153. See Tribunal fédéral, 4P_267–70/2002, ¶ 2.2.
154. Id. at A.b.
155. This was the first time an Olympic gold medal had changed hands following a decision by
the CAS.
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the vassal of the IOC . . . .
....
. . . There appears to be no viable alternative to this institution,
which can resolve international sports-related disputes quickly
and inexpensively.
Certainly, the plaintiffs have not
suggested one. The CAS, with its current structure, can
undoubtedly be improved. . . . Having gradually built up the
trust of the sporting world, this institution which is now
widely [recognized] and which will soon celebrate its
twentieth birthday, remains one of the principal mainstays of
[organized] sport. 156
The merit of Pechstein’s impartiality claim seemed questionable and it
was almost doomed before it started. As was made clear by the SFT, a basic
principle of Swiss Law is good faith, which naturally applies to arbitration
awards before the CAS and appealed to the SFT. 157 All the CAS awards and
SFT rulings are based on Swiss contract law, which has the requirement of
good faith as one of its guiding principles.
The duty to act in good faith is a universally [recognized]
principle of law that applies also in the framework of arbitral
proceedings and is part of both substantive and procedural
public policy . . . . The bona fides principle encompasses the
duty to act in good faith and the prohibition of abuse of
rights . . . . The duty to act in accordance with the
requirements of good faith applies to both the arbitral tribunal
and the parties . . . . 158
These rules can be excluded of course by agreement of the parties, and,
further, if they wish to object to non-compliance with those rules, then they
must do so immediately “otherwise they shall be deemed to have waived their
right to object.” 159 The fact that Pechstein failed to raise the issue of lack of
impartiality at the time the CAS heard her case proved to have serious
consequences for her appeal. The SFT commented:
156. Tribunal fédéral, 4P_267–70/2002, ¶ 3.3.3.3.
157. See SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § III, art. 15(6) (2006).
158. TOBIAS ZUBERBÜHLER ET AL., SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY 149 (2005) (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 149–50.
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The Appellant herself appealed to the CAS and signed the
Procedural Order of September 29, 2009 without raising
objections with respect to independence or impartiality.
Under these circumstances it is not compatible with the
principle of good faith to raise the issue of impartiality of the
Arbitral Tribunal applied for the first time before the [Swiss]
Federal Tribunal in the framework of an appeal. The
grievance of lack of independence of the arbitral tribunal
asserted by the Appellant is therefore not capable of
appeal. . . . [H]er submissions of a general nature do not give
rise to reasonable doubts as to the independence of the CAS.
The grievance of lack of independence of the CAS would thus
be unsubstantiated anyway. 160
Pechstein also tried to suggest that the President of the Arbitral Tribunal
was partial, seemingly basing her accusation on a comment that he made in
2007 suggesting his “hard line on doping issues,” his close ties with the IOC,
and its prominence in sports governance in Italy. 161 Once more, these
concerns were given short shrift by the SFT, as they were dismissed on the
grounds of being too vague and lacking connection to the case at hand. 162
The SFT raised an interesting point in relation to the CAS’ refusal to allow
Pechstein’s manager to attend the hearing. Although, the SFT confirmed the
CAS Rule Article R44.2, which held that “[u]nless the parties agree otherwise,
the hearings are not public,” 163 and that Pechstein failed to demonstrate to
what extent Swiss Law governing international arbitration enabled such
proceedings to take place in public, 164 the SFT nevertheless had some unease
about this issue, suggesting that where the athlete requests it, such hearings
should be held in public. Specifically, the SFT stated,
Be this as it may, in view of the outstanding significance of
the CAS in the field of sport, it would be desirable for a public
hearing to be held on request by the athlete concerned with a
view to the trust in the independence and fairness of the

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶¶ 3.1.2–3.1.3.
Id. ¶ 3.2.
Id.
CAS CODE R44.2.
Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 4.1.
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decision making process. 165
It will be interesting to see whether the CAS introduces such a provision
into its code, in much the same way that it moved to accommodate the implied
criticisms made of its relationship with the IOC in Gundel. 166
In comprehensively dismissing the appeal, the SFT reiterated the very
clear lines with regard to public policy, 167 which Pechstein had suggested had
been violated by the award against her.
The material adjudication of a dispute violates public policy
only when it ignores some fundamental legal principles and is
therefore plainly inconsistent with the fundamental, widely
recognized system of values, which according to the
prevailing opinions in Switzerland, should be the basis of any
legal order. Among such principles are: the fidelity to
contracts (pacta sunt servanda), the prohibition of abuse of
rights, the principle of good faith, the prohibition of
expropriation without compensation, the prohibition of
discrimination and the protection of incapables. 168
Although these particular principles, upon which the central pillars of
Swiss Law are founded, are perhaps fairly obvious, the notion of public policy
detailed in the Swiss Private International Law Act 169 (PILA) is clearly
capable of wider interpretation.
Pechstein suggested that one such
interpretation should include the notion of human dignity and that submitting
her samples to a veterinarian violated her own human dignity, 170 essentially
treating her as an animal, and, therefore, the interpretation should be deemed
to be against public policy which should, according to Article 190(e) of PILA,
annul the award. 171 The SFT, in rejecting Pechstein’s submission, pointed out
the weakness in her very narrow interpretation of the realities of expert
scientific testimony. “The fact that the principle of human dignity would
prohibit a university based scientist, who is inter alia a qualified veterinarian,
165. Id.
166. See Gundel, 1 DIGEST OF COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT AWARDS at 569–70.
167. An award will be deemed to be against public policy if it disregards certain principles in
both the considerations and also in the findings of the award. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 6.1.
168. Id.
169. See LOI FÉDÉRAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ, art. 190(e).
170. Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 6.5; BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 8,
2011, art. 7 (Switz.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sz00000_.html.
171. LOI FÉDÉRAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ, art. 190(e).
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from acting as an expert in the framework of doping proceedings is not
demonstrated.” 172
Had the SFT accepted Pechstein’s appeal on this point, then taken to its
logical, albeit extended conclusion, there would appear to have been a real
danger that the utility of scientific evidence produced before tribunals and the
analysis of samples in the first place would be severely compromised, with
only scientists with a very narrow range of expertise authorized to examine
samples. It is clear from the SFT that the pedigree of the scientist is irrelevant
as long as the scientist has relevant expertise.
In roundly rejecting Pechstein’s appeal the SFT concluded that
she makes criticisms of an appellate nature of the award and
presents her own views of the facts . . . . [S]he refers to
numerous findings by the CAS as arbitrary, contradictory,
incorrect or contrary to the file, but does not demonstrate to
what extent it was impossible for her as a result to put forward
and prove her point . . . in the proceedings. She merely claims
sweepingly at various points a violation of the principle of the
right to be heard or of public policy without meeting the
statutory requirements for reasons. 173
C. Request to the Swiss Federal Tribunal for Revision 174
In a request for revision dated March 4, 2010, Pechstein submitted to the
SFT that it should annul the previous award of the CAS and send the matter
back to the CAS for a new award. 175 Concerning the role of revision by the
SFT in international arbitration awards, the SFT commented:
The Federal Private International Law of December 18, 1997
contains no provisions as to the revision of arbitral awards
within the meaning of Art 176 ff PILA. According to case law
of the Federal Tribunal, which filled the lacuna, the parties to
an international arbitration have the extraordinary legal
recourse of revision available, for which the Federal tribunal
has jurisdiction. If the Federal Tribunal upholds a request it
does not decide the matter itself but sends it back to the
172.
173.
174.
(Switz.).
175.

Tribunal fédéral, 4A_612/2009, ¶ 6.5.
Id. ¶ 6.6 (citation omitted).
See generally Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Sept. 28, 2010, 4A_144/2010
Id. ¶ C.
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arbitral tribunal that decided it or to a new arbitral tribunal to
be constituted. 176
The grounds for revision are very restrictive:
[R]evision may be sought when the petitioner subsequently
discovers significant facts or decisive evidence which he
could not adduce in the previous proceedings to the exclusion
of facts and evidence which emerged only after the award.
The new facts must be significant, i.e., they must be suitable
to change the factual basis of the award so that an accurate
legal evaluation could lead to another decision. . . . Should the
new evidence prove factual allegations already made
previously, the petitioner must show that he could not bring
the evidence in the earlier proceedings. 177
The SFT was scathing of Pechstein’s request for revision, pointing out that
she brought no new evidence forward and instead relied on evidence that dealt
extensively with the original CAS award, namely with the issue of her
hereditary spherocytosis, the inherited disorder that she alleged caused the
anomalies in her blood parameters, which eventually led to her two-year
ban. 178 Further, the SFT made it clear that Pechstein failed to cross the
substantial threshold of demonstrating exactly why she had been unable to
previously bring this evidence. 179 It dismissed her allegations as vague,
relying on scientifically unsubstantiated methods over and above a more
established analysis. 180 Based on such damning criticism, it is hardly
surprising that the application for revision was rejected, with the SFT
concluding,
The Petitioner’s arguments in this respect merely seek a new
assessment of the evidence. Yet there is no ground for
revision simply because the Arbitral Tribunal would have
wrongly assessed some facts already known in the arbitral
proceedings. . . . The request for revision is to be rejected to

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 2.1.2.
Id. ¶ 2.3.
Id.
Id.
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the extent that the matter is capable of revision. 181
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems that the biological passport has arrived to add a considerable
weapon to the armory of the anti-doping industry. It has received welcome
backing from both the CAS and the SFT and appears to be firmly established
to now sit alongside those other pillars of anti-doping control, such as the
principle of strict liability, the whereabouts rule, WADA’s Anti-Doping
Administration and Management System, and nonanalytical positives. What
this development does for the first time, though, is to give the hint of a new
dawn in anti-doping control. The biological passport raises the possibility of
shifting the emphasis away from the doping athlete and instead toward
prioritizing the “clean” athlete.
Up to this point in time—quite naturally and due to the limitations
imposed by the culture of testing, subsequent failed tests, and consequent
bans⎯the emphasis throughout sports has usually been on exposing athletes
who are cheating. It is without a doubt that the biological passport will
continue to do this. Although it is also the case that, periodically, participants
have been caught up unwittingly in the system following either the unknowing
or blameless ingestion of a banned substance, and it is the possible injustices
created by this problem and the accompanying principle of strict liability that
Article 10.5 (exceptional circumstances) of the Code sought to ameliorate.
However, the use of nonanalytical positives highlighted throughout the
BALCO scandal began to shift the emphasis away from the simple equation of
failed test plus strict liability equals guilt and a ban. For the first time, we had
the notion of guilt without the failure of a test or indeed the manipulation of a
doping sample. What the passport does is raise the possibility of athletes
being able to demonstrate their innocence rather than having to disprove their
guilt through the production of a passport, which contains a profile that is
indisputably consistent with a non-doping athlete. Possession of a clean and
unblemished passport may come to be viewed as the gateway into sporting
events, as opposed to the current regime, which seeks to exclude athletes from
such events in the shape of bans following positive tests. If this shift in
emphasis can lead to a consequent change in culture and attitude, then the
impact of the passport may be felt far beyond the simple notion of making it
harder to cheat in sports.

181. Id. ¶¶ 2.4, 3.

